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Impairments in social cognition are a key symptom of autism spectrum disorder (ASD).
People with autism have great difficulty with understanding the beliefs and desires
of other people. In recent years literature has begun to examine the link between
impairments in social cognition and abilities which demand the use of spatial and
social skills, such as visual perspective taking (VPT). Flavell (1977) defined two levels
of perspective taking: VPT level 1 is the ability to understand that other people have a
different line of sight to ourselves, whereas VPT level 2 is the understanding that two
people viewing the same item from different points in space may see different things. So
far, literature on whether either level of VPT is impaired or intact in autism is inconsistent.
Here we review studies which have examined VPT levels 1 and 2 in people with autism
with a focus on their methods. We conclude the review with an evaluation of the findings
into VPT in autism and give recommendations for future research which may give a clearer
insight into whether perspective taking is truly impaired in autism.
Keywords: visual perspective taking, autism spectrum disorder, spatial transformations, social cognition, spatial
cognition, theory of mind
Visual perspective taking (VPT) is the ability to see the world
from another person’s perspective, taking into account what they
see and how they see it (Flavell, 1977). In order to perform VPT
successfully a person must draw upon both spatial and social
information. The spatial information used in VPT includes the
current position of both the viewer and the target and the posi-
tion of objects in the environment in relation to the self and others
(Zacks et al., 2003; Kessler and Thomson, 2009; Kessler andWang,
2012). For instance, you are sitting at a table with a friend drink-
ing tea, the sugar pot is on their left hand side and the teapot is
oriented with the handle toward your friend. The social informa-
tion used in VPT involves the simultaneous representation of two
differing points of view, taking into account whether someone
else can see an object, or how they see that object (Aichhorn et al.,
2006). For example, your friend can see the handle of the teapot
while you see the spout. By interpreting the spatial relationships
between objects in a social framework it becomes possible to form
a rich representation of differing viewpoints which are useful in a
variety of social tasks.
Impairments in social skills are a key symptom of autism spec-
trum disorder (ASD) (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Happe, 1995; Frith
and Frith, 2007; Frith, 2012; Senju, 2012). Research has shown
that people with autism have particular difficulty with theory
of mind (ToM) and representing differing beliefs (Baron-Cohen
et al., 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Happe, 1995; Baron-Cohen et al.,
1997; Frith, 2001; Senju et al., 2009; Senju, 2012). Some theo-
rists believe that ToM and VPT share common cognitive processes
(Hamilton et al., 2009) as they both involve the simultaneous rep-
resentation of two differing points of view (Aichhorn et al., 2006).
If this is the case then we may expect that people with autism
would be impaired at VPT as well as ToM. However, others have
suggested that VPT and ToM are completely separate constructs
and that it is entirely possible to be impaired at one and not the
other (Leslie, 1987). Studies of whether VPT is intact in autism
have been inconsistent (Reed and Peterson, 1990; Tan and Harris,
1991; Yirmiya et al., 1994; Hamilton et al., 2009). The focus of
this review will be to examine studies of VPT in autism, assessing
evidence for the existence of impairment. It will also consider the
relationship between VPT and ToM, as well as the contribution of
spatial abilities in VPT. We hope to set out a clear distinction for
testing different types of VPT in autism as well as recommenda-
tions for experimental paradigms which may help to answer the
question of whether these abilities may be impaired.
VISUAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING
There are two different levels of VPT outlined in the litera-
ture (Flavell, 1977). VPT level one (VPT1) is the basic ability to
judge what a person can and cannot see (i.e., whether an item
is occluded from their line of sight). The development of VPT1
marks the period at which children begin to understand that other
people may be able to see different things, for example, know-
ing that if a toy is behind a parent that they will not see it until
they turn around. VPT1 has been measured using a variety of
tasks which require children to identify whether an adult can
see an item which may/may not be occluded (Masangkay et al.,
1974; Flavell et al., 1981). VPT level two (VPT2) is the ability to
understand that two different people viewing a scene or object
simultaneously do not necessarily see objects in the same way
(Flavell, 1977). Tasks measuring VPT2 require a participant to be
able to say how someone else sees an object or scene, for example,
if you are standing opposite another person looking at a car, they
may see the back of the car and you may see the front.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 652 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Pearson et al. Visua perspective taking in autism: a review
The development of VPT skills occur in succession, with VPT1
developing first followed by VPT2 (Flavell, 1977). Currently, it is
thought that VPT1 develops between the ages of 18–24 months
in typical children (Flavell et al., 1981; Moll and Tomasello, 2004,
2006; Moll et al., 2007) and VPT2 later at around 4–5 years old
(Gzesh and Surber, 1985). Recent advances in the field of ToM
research have shown that by using more implicit measures which
are less reliant on language (such as eye tracking) we can find evi-
dence of ToM skills earlier in infancy (Southgate et al., 2007). It
has also been suggested that VPT1 may be able to operate in a
spontaneous and implicit fashion (Samson et al., 2005; Surtees
et al., 2012). Studies of VPT to date have used only explicit mea-
sures in their methodology (i.e., asking a child to point to an item
or verbally report where someone is looking). Thus, it is possi-
ble that if implicit measures similar to those of Southgate et al.
(2007) were used to examine VPT we may find that it develops
earlier than previously thought.
Recently, efforts have been made to provide a clear distinc-
tion between VPT levels 1 and 2, and there are several ways
in which this division can be drawn. This includes reference to
embodiment, implicit/explicit processing, and dyadic/triadic rep-
resentations. Surtees et al. (2013) makes a distinction based on
embodiment. He suggests that VPT1 tasks require only visual
(line of sight) information and not an egocentric embodied trans-
formation, while VPT2 tasks require greater spatial information
processing including the full transformation of the participant’s
viewpoint to that of the target. A different distinction is based on
implicit/explicit processing. Samson et al. (2005) suggest VPT1
can occur implicitly and spontaneously. She presented partici-
pants with images of a room in which there was a human avatar
and colored disks on the walls. Participants were asked to judge
how many disks they could see or how many the avatar could see.
The number of disks visible to the participants and the avatar were
not always the same (for example, sometimes the avatar could
not see all of the disks), creating perspective congruent and per-
spective incongruent conditions. The authors found that typical
adults’ responses were slower and less accurate when the avatar’s
view was incongruent with their own, suggesting that they implic-
itly coded the avatar’s visual perspective (implicit VPT1) even
when not required to by the task. A third way to distinguish VPT1
and 2 focuses on the number of relationships that a participant
must encode in order to perform. Warreyn et al. (2005) argue
VPT1 is based upon the use of dyadic representations whereas
VPT2 is reliant on triadic representations. Dyads involve a rep-
resentation of the relationship between a person and an object
independent of the self (i.e., Jim can see the cat). Dyadic repre-
sentations appear to be based upon the use of eye gaze following
and line of sight (Warreyn et al., 2005). Triadic representations,
involve coding the relationship between the self, another and an
object (i.e., I can see the cat’s tail whereas Jim can see the cat’s
nose). It remains to be seen which of these three types of division
between level 1 and level 2 VPT is more valuable in understanding
the overall phenomenon of perspective taking.
The present review focuses on studies of VPT in autism, where
these distinctions have seldom been made clear. Previous studies
suggest that embodimentmay be reduced in autism (Brunye et al.,
2012; Kessler and Wang, 2012; Eigsti, 2013) which would imply
that VPT1 should be intact but VPT2 impaired. In contrast, stud-
ies pointing to abnormal implicit ToM (in the presence of normal
explicit ToM) (Senju, 2012) would predict that VPT1 should be
harder in autism than VPT2. However, this might only be the case
when VPT1 and 2 are tested with appropriately implicit methods,
which has rarely been the case. Finally, it has been suggested that
dyadic representation is intact in autism while triadic represen-
tation is impaired (Leekam et al., 1997). This implies that VPT1
should be normal in autism while VPT2 might not be. We revisit
the issue of how VPT performance in autism relates to the key
cognitive differences between VPT1 and VPT2 in the discussion.
One of the issues in assessing VPT in autism is the variety of
methodologies that have been used. It has been suggested that
people with autism may find some tasks easier to perform than
others (Langdon and Coltheart, 2001) making it difficult to assert
whether a lack of impairment is a result of intact VPT skills or the
task used. Studies of VPT can be categorized by the types of ques-
tions they use (Figure 1). Most often studies focus on questions
about item appearance (“turn it so I can see the ___”) or loca-
tion (“which side of the person is the counter?”), as well as viewer
or object rotations (“imagine yourself at the blue side of the table”
vs. “turn it so that you can see the apple”). Studies which examine
VPT1 are most likely to ask questions about line of sight (“can
this person see an object”) rather than questions about the items
appearance from different viewpoints, which is a level 2 VPT skill
(Figure 1).
Evidence for intact/impaired VPT1 and VPT2 in autism has
so far been inconsistent, with studies showing evidence for both
(Hobson, 1984; Leslie and Frith, 1988; Tan and Harris, 1991;
Yirmiya et al., 1994; Leekam et al., 1997; Warreyn et al., 2005;
Hamilton et al., 2009). Here we will examine studies and the
methods they have used, taking into account what they add to
the study of VPT in autism.
INCLUSION CRITERIA
An exhaustive search of the literature on VPT in autism was
conducted using PubMed, web of science and Google Scholar.
The search terms entered were “autism”/“ASD” and “visual per-
spective taking”/“VPT.” Thirteen papers were identified which
appeared to fit these criteria. All 13 papers examining VPT in
autism have been included in this review.
Though studies aim to examine either VPT1 or VPT2, many
of the tasks that have been used to test VPT could be completed
using either, i.e., some VPT2 tasks could be completed using a
simple line of sight VPT1 strategy. Here we discuss all studies
which have examined VPT in autism and evaluate whether they
fall into the category of VPT1 or VPT2.
VPT IN AUTISM
VPT has often been examined using tasks which ask questions
about item visibility (Moll and Tomasello, 2004). In these stud-
ies, the child is presented with an item which is either in view or
occluded from an adult. The child has to respond to whether the
adult can see the item. Explicit studies of item visibility in typi-
cally developing (TD) children have shown that they are able to
respond accurately from around 2 years old (Moll and Tomasello,
2004, 2006). Hobson (1984) examined VPT in adolescents with
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FIGURE 1 | Example of different ways in which VPT can be examined.
(A) Line of sight paradigms ask questions about whether a person can see an
item, for example, “can the person on the far side of the table see the sugar
bowl?” (B) Item appearance paradigms ask questions about how an item
would appear from different points of view, for instance, “would the person
on the far side of the table see the front of the cereal box?” (C) Laterality
paradigms ask questions about the position of certain items, for instance, “is
the milk to the left or right hand side of the cereal box?” (D) Item location
paradigms ask questions about the prepositional location of items, for
instance, “is the sugar bowl behind the cereal box?” (E) Array paradigms ask
questions about the arrangement of the items in relation to each other-the
way in which the array appears. For instance, participants may be shown an
arrangement and asked “does the table look like this?” (F) Rotation
paradigms ask questions about what items would look like if they were
rotated to a different orientation, for instance, “if the cereal box was turned
90◦, what would you see?”
autism and VMA (verbal mental age) matched TD children using
a “hide and seek” game paradigm, and found that the ability to
perform VPT was intact. Participants were presented with a dis-
play which included hiding holes and two figures. The participant
had to “hide” their figure from the other, indicating in which hole
the figure would need to be placed so that they would not be seen.
The participants with autism performed similarly to the ability
matched TD children. These results have since been replicated
using a similar hiding paradigm (Reed and Peterson, 1990; Tan
and Harris, 1991; Reed, 2002). The findings from these studies
suggest that children with ASD are able to understand the concept
of “hiding” and what other people can see.
VPT has also been examined using line of sight paradigms.
Leslie and Frith (1988) used a line of sight paradigm to investigate
VPT in children with autism. Participants were presented with a
scene in which a doll sat on one side of a cardboard screen and
a counter was placed on the same side as the doll, or the oppo-
site side. The child had to respond to whether the doll could see
the counter. All of the autistic children were able to complete the
task, suggesting that they had a basic understanding of what the
doll could and could not see.
Baron-Cohen (1989) used a line of sight paradigm to exam-
ine VPT in children with autism and a group of TD children.
Children were presented with a task in which an experimenter
would orient their gaze or body toward one of six items surround-
ing the child and the child would have to identify which item the
experimenter was looking to. The results showed that 92.5% of
the children with ASD passed the task compared to 94.4% of TD
children, suggesting VPT to be intact in the ASD group. Baron-
Cohen’s study has been replicated since, though findings have not
been quite as clear. Leekam et al. (1997) compared a group of
ASD children to a group of VMA matched typical children on
Baron-Cohen’s perspective taking task. Though results showed
no significant difference between the groups, there was a ceiling
effect in the TD group (100%) whereas the ASD group scored on
average much lower (66.6%). They also found that VMA was a
significant predictor of performance, with those of lower VMA
showing more difficulty with the task.
Warreyn et al. (2005) also conducted a replication of Baron-
Cohen (1989) and found that young children with autism per-
formed worse on the VPT task compared to age matched TD
children. Similarly to Leekam et al. (1997), they found VMA to
be a significant predictor of VPT ability. The authors suggested
that VPT may develop later in children with autism and that they
may be delayed compared to TD children.
All of the studies presented above (Hobson, 1984; Leslie and
Frith, 1988; Baron-Cohen, 1989; Reed and Peterson, 1990; Tan
and Harris, 1991; Leekam et al., 1997; Reed, 2002; Warreyn et al.,
2005) can be classified as Level 1 VPT tasks on the basis that they
examine line of sight.
VPT has also been examined using questions about item
appearance. Mizuno et al. (2011) used a paradigm similar to that
of Masangkay et al. (1974), in which adults with autism were
shown a picture card with two sides. Participants were asked to
identify which side they would see or another person would see
in two different VPT conditions. In the first condition partici-
pants were asked a “what” question (“what can I see?” or “what
can Sarah see?” vs. “What can you see?”). In the second condition
they were asked a “who” question (i.e., “who will see the car-
rot?”). Results showed that participants with autism were slower
in the “what” condition than in the “who” condition. The authors
argued that this was a result of difficulty switching between per-
sonal pronouns (“what can you see?” requires the participant to
make the link between “you” being themselves’), which people
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with autism often find difficult (Lee et al., 1994). As the study
uses a classic VPT1 paradigm, it seems most appropriate to label
this a VPT1 task.
Hobson (1984) compared children with autism to a group
of younger, VMA matched typical children. To examine VPT,
Hobson used an object appearance task in which children had to
identify the viewpoint of a third person (a doll). Typical and ASD
children were presented with a cube which had a different color
on each vertical face. The child was given a chance to familiar-
ize themselves with the cube. Once familiarized the experimenter
would place a doll (Fred) at one side of the cube and ask “Fred
sits here, which colour can he see?” or “place Fred so he can see the
___.” The child was then given a second doll (Mary) and asked to
“put Mary so that Mary sees the same as Fred sees.” Results showed
that there was no significant effect of group, with the ASD chil-
dren performing similarly to the typical children. Hobson did
find a significant effect of verbal ability in the ASD group, with
higher functioning ASD children performing better. This is con-
sistent with the findings fromWarreyn et al. (2005) and (Leekam
et al., 1997), and suggests that verbal ability may be an impor-
tant predictor of VPT. It is also worth noting that neither group
performed at ceiling level in Hobson’s task meaning any group
differences should be clear. As the task could be completed using
a VPT1 strategy in which participants use line of sight to respond
rather than performing a first person transformation it seems
appropriate to define this as a level one VPT task.
Reed and Peterson (1990) also examined VPT in children
with autism alongside ToM using an item appearance paradigm.
Thirteen ASD children and 13 VMA matched TD children were
tested on their ability to rotate a familiar item (a toy) so that the
experimenter could see a distinct feature (i.e., “turn it so that I
can see the nose”). Four different toys were presented and children
had to score 100% across all four trials to pass. In contrast the
cognitive perspective taking task required the children to perform
the Sally-Anne ToM task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). The authors
found that the children with autism performed similarly to the
typical children in the VPT task, but worse in the cognitive per-
spective taking task. The authors concluded that it could not be
the social aspect of ToM that participants with autism had diffi-
culty with, as the VPT task was also social and that poor ToMmay
be a result of impaired abstract thinking. These findings suggested
that VPT and mentalizing are dissociable abilities, with VPT tap-
ping into a different process then ToM. However, the authors
found a ceiling effect amongst both the typical and autistic chil-
dren in the VPT task. This makes it possible that group differences
may have been masked due to the task being particularly easy for
both groups of participants. This task was classified as a VPT2
task by the authors on the basis that it meets criteria for two peo-
ple viewing an object from different vantage points (Flavell et al.,
1981). However, participants could also use a basic line of sight
(VPT1) strategy (turning the item until the feature (i.e., nose)
was in the line of sight of the viewer) to respond. The distinc-
tion between level one and two VPT are blurred in this task, and
it may be more appropriate to label this a VPT1 task.
Tan and Harris (1991) examined VPT in children with autism
using an item location task. Twenty children with autism and
20VMA matched TD children were tested on their ability to
identify the view one of two soft dolls would have of a third object
(i.e., which object would John say was “in front?”). The authors
also measured the children’s ToM using a desire understanding
task, presenting the children with scenarios in which someone
was offered food that they did or did not like. Children had to
respond to whether the person would be happy or unhappy with
the offer. There was no significant effect of group on either task,
with the autistic children performing similarly to the typical chil-
dren on both VPT and desire understanding. As with Reed and
Peterson’s task, Tan and Harris also found a ceiling effect across
both groups of participants which may have masked any group
differences. The authors concluded that a global social deficit in
autism is unlikely, and that impairment may be related to process
and task specific delays. As this task measures how two people
seeing a given object may view it differently due to a change in
orientation or location (i.e., for Mary, the pencil is in front of the
block, whereas for John the pencil is behind the block) it can be
considered a VPT2 task.
Yirmiya et al. (1994) examined VPT in children with ASD
using an object rotation paradigm in which children were pre-
sented with familiar item (toys) on a rotating table. The task
required both object rotation and item appearance (“how would
this look to me”). ASD children were compared to age and IQ
matched TD children on their ability to turn a turntable con-
taining 3 or 10 items so that it matched the point of view of the
experimenter. Children were instructed to “turn it around so that
youwill see it fromwhere you are in the sameway that I see it from
where I am” or “turn it around until you see it in the exact same
way that I see it now from where I am standing.” They found that
children with ASD showed a higher number of errors than the
typical children. Errors were further categorized into two different
types: incorrect (in which the answer was simply wrong) or ego-
centric (in which the child displayed the turntable with their own
point of view). Children with autism were found to display more
incorrect errors in the 10 item trials, and more egocentric errors
in the 3 item trials. This suggests that the 10 item trials were more
reliant onmemory, as if both trial types were equated for difficulty
you would expect to see similar types of errors across both. This
task demands the calculation of two different viewpoints and is
clearly a VPT2 task, but as the authors note it has heavy memory
demands which may limit performance.
Hamilton et al. (2009) used a related paradigm to examine
VPT, mental rotation and ToM ability in a group of ASD children
compared to verbal ability matched TD children. Two further
groups of TD children were also included in the study, a typical
mid-age range group and a typical older group. For the VPT task
children were presented with the toy on the turntable and asked
to identify their own point of view on the answer sheet. The toy
was then covered and a doll placed at another spot on the table.
The child was asked to identify the view of the toy the doll would
have when the pot was lifted. For themental rotation task children
were shown a toy on a turntable and asked to identify which pic-
ture on their answer sheet matched their view. The toy was then
covered and rotated and the child asked to identify which view
they would see when the pot was lifted. ToM was assessed using
a battery of different ToM tasks, including diverse desires and the
Sally-Anne task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Results showed that
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the children with ASD were significantly worse on the VPT tri-
als compared to the typical children, but performed better on the
mental rotation task. It was also found that VPT was significantly
predicted by ToM score, suggesting mentalizing is important for
perspective taking. The authors suggested that VPT relies on the
same cognitive systems as ToM. This is the only study reviewed
which includes both a social and non-social spatial task, as well
as a measure of ToM. The task attempts to integrate different task
demands (viewer and item rotation, item appearance questions)
making it possible to start pinpointing specific difficulties with
VPT. The use of a control spatial (non-social) task also allows the
authors to make clear conclusions about which aspects of VPT
that people with autism find difficult (social as opposed to the
spatial). We suggest that as the task explicitly requires participants
to say what one object would look like from two different points
of view, with no line of sight information available (the target was
covered with a pot), that this be classified as a VPT2 task.
Dawson and Fernald (1987) also examined VPT in children
with autism using an object rotation paradigm in which children
had to orient an item a certain way for the experimenter to see
it. No control group was included in the study. Participants were
presented with cards, blocks and various picture and asked to ori-
ent it “so the experimenter could see the face/tail etc . . ..” None of
the children scored at ceiling level on the task, and performance
correlated with social skills, but without a control group it is hard
to interpret this data.
David and colleagues examined VPT and ToM in high func-
tioning adults with Asperger syndrome compared to age and
IQ matched TD adults. Participants completed two tasks, one
examined VPT and the other examined ToM. In the ToM task par-
ticipants were presented with a virtual image of a person with one
item either side of them. The person could be displaying one of
three possible body, face and hand postures (positive, neutral, or
negative) toward one of the objects. An example of a positive hand
gesture would be pointing, whereas negative would be holding
the hand out with the palm facing forwards (similar to a “stop”
signal). The participant’s task was to identify which object the
other person desired (mentalizing for other) or which they would
desire themselves (mentalizing for self). In the VPT task the par-
ticipant was presented with the same image of the person with two
objects, one of which was elevated. The participant had to iden-
tify which object was elevated from their own point of view, or
from that of the other person using a laterality judgment (i.e., the
item on my left is higher). Measures of speed and accuracy were
taken from each participant. In the ToM task results showed that
the ASD participants were significantly slower and less accurate at
identifying the correct answer when mentalizing for other. They
were also trending toward slower mentalizing for self (as accu-
racy on this task was subjective accuracy could not be measured).
There were no differences found between groups for speed or
accuracy in the VPT task, for self or other. The authors acknowl-
edged that the VPT task may have been too easy compared to the
mentalizing task which may explain differences across tasks. One
limitation is that this task does not require participants to take the
visual perspective of the other, but only to judge what is on the
left or right. Spatial-transformation tasks (Parsons, 1987; Zacks
et al., 1999) requires participants to make laterality judgments
about an item in relation to another person, but it is not clear
if these are the same as VPT tasks. Further research is needed into
these paradigms in order to assess where they fall in relation to
perspective taking.
Similarly, Zwickel et al. (2011) examined VPT and ToM in
adults with autism and age and IQmatched TD adults using a lat-
erality judgment paradigm. In the VPT task participants viewed
videos of animated triangles (Castelli et al., 2002), and during
the videos a dot appeared to the left or right of the triangle.
Participants were asked simply “was the dot on your left or right.”
On incongruent trials a dot on the participant’s left fell on the
right of the triangle (or vice versa), while on congruent trials a
dot on the participant’s left was also on the left of the triangle
(or both on the right). Critically, this congruency only arises if
the triangle is perceived as an animate active creature. Both typ-
ical and autistic participants showed a congruency effect in this
task, demonstrating that they could spontaneously consider the
left/right orientation of an animated shape. However, the autis-
tic participants were less good at judging the mental states of
the triangles in the same animations. This is consistent with the
findings of David et al. (2010). Similarly, it is not clear if this
task truly demands calculation of the visual perspective of another
agent rather than just their orientation. More research is needed
to explore the use of visuo-spatial perspective taking paradigms
in autism.
EVALUATING VPT IN AUTISM
We have reviewed 13 studies of VPT in autism, and suggest that
7 of these assessed VPT1, 3 assessed VPT2 and 3 were unclear
or assessed laterality (see Table 1). Of the 7 studies examining
VPT1, 5 report no differences between typical and autistic partici-
pants while the other 2 find that participants with autism perform
worse than typical participants. Of the 3 studies examining VPT2,
2 report group differences and the third does not.
There are several interesting issues arising from this review
which can guide future research. One important problem is that
the boundary between VPT levels one and two is not always clear.
A task might be intended to assess VPT1, but participants might
choose to use a VPT2 strategy. Or if a study designed to measure
VPT2 could also be completed using line of sight, it is possible
that people with autism could pass based on this information.
This is particularly the case in studies which name the item which
can be seen from a particular location [e.g., place Fred so he can see
the red side, (Hobson, 1984)]. Here the child need only consider
Fred’s line of sight to the red part of the cube, but some children
might prefer to consider the relationship of the whole cube to the
rest of the scene including the child’s own viewpoint. Thus, this
task could be solved by a VPT1 or VPT2 strategy. To minimize
this issue, we suggest that line of sight tasks seem to be the clearest
way to assess VPT 1 (Leslie and Frith, 1988; Baron-Cohen, 1989;
Leekam et al., 1997; Warreyn et al., 2005), whilst item appearance
tasks appear to be the best way to assess VPT2 (Hamilton et al.,
2009) see Figures 1A,B.
A related issue is the use of different strategies by different
participants. However well an experimenter designs a task, it is
always possible that participants could solve the puzzle in a differ-
ent way. For example, many VPT tasks could potentially be solved
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with a purely spatial mental rotation (Zacks and Tversky, 2005).
This approach is less efficient, but it is possible that different
groups of participants prefer to use different strategies. One way
to approach this issue is to consider the use of appropriate con-
trol tasks to assess other cognitive skills such as children’s memory
abilities (especially for complex displays), their language skills (for
complex questions) and their abilities to perform spatial transfor-
mations. The comparison of an experimental task and a closely
matched control task in the method of fine cuts (Frith andHappe,
1994) would allow for close examination of the cognitive compo-
nents which distinguish the different levels of perspective taking.
For example, Surtees et al. (2013) suggests that VPT2 requires an
embodied spatial transformation while VPT1 does not. If this is
the case, then VPT2 abilities should correlate with performance
on other tasks requiring embodiment, but not to mental rotation
tasks that do not involve bodies. If different groups of partici-
pants use different strategies to perform VPT tasks, this might
also emerge in the relationship between their VPT skill and other
cognitive skills.
Furthermore, this raises another important question concern-
ing how the social and spatial elements of VPT2 fit together:
Does intact VPT require spatial and social information, or could
it be done using just one of these? If VPT2 can be completed
using social or spatial information it makes sense that it can be
unimpaired even in the face of significant ToM deficits, as partic-
ipants’ could rely on the use of spatial information to complete
a task. Langdon and Coltheart (2001) suggested that tasks using
questions about item location (i.e., Tan and Harris (1991)) were
particularly open to completion via spatial cues making it possi-
ble for those with social difficulty to perform. However, if VPT2
requires the integration of both spatial and social information to
be effective, then even good spatial ability would not completely
compensate for poor social processing. Again, determining the
strategies and cognitive mechanisms that different participants
use to perform VPT tasks is critical here.
Another issue concerns the participant populations tested. The
majority of studies presented in this review were conducted on
children, and several on groups of children with impaired cogni-
tive functioning. It is difficult to collect reaction time data from
children, meaning that more subtle differences in VPT ability
related to an inability to integrate social and spatial information
may be missed. The two studies conducted with adults (David
et al., 2010; Zwickel et al., 2011) did not find group differences
but did not use typical VPT tasks. It is possible that [as found in
ToM research (Ozonoff et al., 1991)], high functioning adults may
be able to pass VPT. Whether this is due to a better understand-
ing of the questions asked, or the development of an alternative
strategy for completion of the tasks is unclear. Both of these sug-
gestions warrant further research and careful consideration of the
paradigms used to examine VPT.
There are also issues in the lack of consistency in matching
groups. Though some of the studies have used rigorous match-
ing techniques (Yirmiya et al., 1994; Hamilton et al., 2009; David
et al., 2010), others took no measure of cognitive ability in their
typical participants. Both Reed and Peterson (1990) and Hobson
(1984) argue for evidence of unimpaired VPT2 performance
in autism. However, they both compared groups of older ASD
children to younger typical children. This suggests that at the very
least the participants with autism may be displaying a delay in the
development of VPT (similar performance to younger children as
opposed to an age matched group) and that it may be inappro-
priate to label their performance as unimpaired. By comparing
ASD participants to both age and ability matched control partic-
ipants, it becomes possible to make stronger claims as to whether
performance on a task is normal, impaired or simply delayed.
These findings present a strong case for using carefully chosen
control groups in studies looking for evidence of impairment in a
population such as autism.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Understanding the relationship between VPT and ToM is impor-
tant. Both of these require the consideration that the other person
has a different representation of the world to oneself, either a
different visual representation or a different belief. Early studies
suggested that VPT is intact in autism while ToM is impaired.
This motivated the idea that it is easy to distinguish visual repre-
sentations of self and other because VPT allows concrete feedback
by physically moving to a different location (Leslie (1987). In
contrast, ToM requires more abstract representations which peo-
ple with ASD find difficult. More recent data suggest that VPT2
and ToM are linked in typical children (Hamilton et al., 2009),
in those with specific language impairment (Farrant et al., 2006)
and in the brain (Aichhorn et al., 2006). This implies that VPT2
and ToM may share similar underlying cognitive mechanisms.
Certainly, many false belief tasks rely on the ability to distin-
guish what people have seen (Sally did not see Anne move the
marble) which draws upon VPT. VPT has been found to acti-
vate the temporo-parietal junction, an area commonly found to
be activated by ToM tasks (Aichhorn et al., 2006). It has been
suggested that ToM may be driven by different mechanisms or
strategies in people with autism compared to TD people (Tan
and Harris, 1991). We believe it may also be worth considering
that this could also be the case for VPT in people with autism.
If both are being driven by different mechanisms it may explain
why some studies have shown VPT to be unimpaired alongside
impaired ToM (Tan and Harris, 1991) and vice versa (Hamilton
et al., 2009). Further studies of the relationship between ToM
and VPT would be very useful, as would studies examining the
cognitive mechanisms which underlie each.
It is also worth considering how researchers can tease apart
the specific contributions of social and spatial mechanism in VPT.
Several VPT tasks have been used successfully in TD individuals
which have allowed researchers to emphasize the spatial or social
aspects. The use of these paradigms may provide us with useful
information about perspective taking in autism. As described ear-
lier, Samson et al. (2005) investigated the social components of
VPT in an implicit perspective taking task. Results showed that
participants could not ignore the perspective of an avatar, and
made slower responses when the avatar could not see something
which the participant could see. Another VPT task with strong
social demands is Keysar et al. (2003) director task. In this task
the participants stand behind a shelf holding several items while
another person stands in from (the director) and gives instruc-
tions of which items to choose. Not all items are visible to the
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director and so the participant must be able to take the directors
perspective into account to avoid choosing items that they cannot
see. The authors found that participants were not able to inhibit
their own perspective when choosing items and oftenmade incor-
rect responses. This task has been argued to have a strong ToM
component as it relies on the ability to represent someone else’s
false belief (the director believes the “big jar” is the one they can
see, but there is a bigger jar on view to the participant). Both of
these tasks would provide interesting ways of measuring the social
components of VPT.
Kessler and Thomson (2009) developed a task in which they
were able to examine the underlying spatial components present
in perspective taking (termed spatial perspective taking, or SPT).
Participants were presented with images of a human avatar seated
at a table with an item to either side of them (a flower and
a gun). The position of the avatar at the table was rotated to
be more or less congruent with the position of the participant
(providing changes in the angular disparity between the avatar
and viewer). Participants had to make laterality judgments in
regards to the placements of the items from the avatars view-
point. The authors found that the larger the angular disparity
between then avatar and the viewer, the longer participants took
to respond. This demonstrated the underlying spatial transfor-
mation that the participant completed in order to put themselves
in the place of the avatar, highlighting the importance of spatial
mechanisms in perspective taking. These findings show that in
order to take a first person perspective, an embodied transfor-
mation (where the viewer transforms their body to match that
of the avatar or target viewpoint) is often necessary. Mazzarella
et al. (2013) built upon these findings, investigating the neural
underpinnings of spatial perspective taking with a similar exper-
iment which examined SPT under fMRI. In this task participants
were scanned whilst making egocentric (what item is on your
left) vs. altercentric (which item is on their left) judgments about
the placement of items on a table [using the same paradigm as
Kessler and Thomson (2009)]. This was designed to tease apart
the differences in transforming the self to a different position vs.
transforming the self into someone else’s position. The authors
found that though both types of transformation show similar
behavioral data patterns, there was a neural distinction between
the areas engaged during egocentric and altercentric perspec-
tive taking. This suggests that multiple strategies may be used
for putting the self in a different place. These tasks both pro-
vide clear mechanisms for teasing out the spatial components
of VPT, as well as interesting avenues to explore in people with
autism.
Recently, researchers have also begun to examine the link
between autistic traits in TD individuals and how this affects per-
spective taking. As VPT is a sociocognitive ability which impacts
on social interaction, it stands to reason that those with poorer
social skills might also show poorer perspective taking ability.
Three studies have examined this question. First, Kessler and
Wang (2012) examined participants using the same task from
Kessler and Thomson (2009). A measure of autistic traits in these
participants was taken using the Autism Quotient (AQ, Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001). The authors found that participants who
scored higher on the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) showed
more difficulty with performing egocentric transformations in a
VPT2 task than low AQ scorers. However these high AQ partic-
ipants also showed quicker response times. The results further
suggest that using an embodied perspective slowed participant’s
responses at higher angular disparities as it took longer for the
participant to transform their body to match that of the target.
Participants with poorer embodiment skills did not slow their
response times, most likely due to the use of a non-embodied
transformation strategy. Using a very similar task, Brunye et al.
(2012) also found that high AQ scorers had difficulty with using
an egocentric reference frame in VPT2, though in this study these
participants showed slower response times. This suggested that
these high AQ participants were attempting to use an embod-
ied strategy, but found it more difficult. Finally, Shelton et al.
(2012) also found a link between spatial skills and autistic traits.
In their study participants were presented with a three moun-
tains (Piaget and Inhelder, 1956) like scene, in which an array
of three buildings were visible to participants. A doll was placed
facing the array and participants had to respond to which point
of view the doll would see. Their study showed that participants
with high AQ scores were less accurate than those with low AQ
scores.
Together, all these suggest that autistic traits (as well as autism
itself) can influence a participant’s ability to performVPT2. These
studies are important for two reasons. Firstly they demonstrate
that autistic traits (not just a diagnosis of autism) impact on the
ability to take another perspective. Secondly, they add weight to
the argument that those who find it difficult to complete VPT2
using an embodied perspective may develop an alternative strat-
egy. The findings from these studies provide a strong motivation
for considering the types of participant samples used in VPT2
research and measuring traits which could affect performance
alongside carefully designed paradigms and tasks.
CONCLUSIONS
From the evidence presented in this review, the majority of stud-
ies suggest that whilst VPT1 may be intact in people with autism,
VPT2 is impaired. We suggest that this is a result of the cognitive
mechanisms involved in the different levels of VPT, with VPT2
drawing on embodied spatial transformations and triadic repre-
sentations (Surtees et al., 2013) more than VPT1. Future studies
should carefully consider the cognitive differences between VPT1
and VPT2. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the abil-
ity to perform egocentric transformations (a process which can
be seen as the first step in completing VPT2 (Yu and Zacks, 2010)
could be impaired in autism, but may also be affected in people
with high levels of autistic traits (Brunye et al., 2012; Kessler and
Wang, 2012; Shelton et al., 2012). It is clear that more research
is needed into the processes related to VPT2 in autism in order
to clarify these suggestions. There is a strong case to be made for
more inclusion of measures of general spatial ability in studies on
VPT and the use of a “fine cuts” technique when designing stud-
ies. This will allow researchers to tease apart impairments in the
spatial demands of a task vs. the social. The recommendations
set out in this review provide a strong motivation for investi-
gating VPT in autism and shed light on why findings so far are
inconsistent.
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